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Abstract 
The studies of the family firms’ earnings quality have not yet concluded about individual or 
family as majority owner in firm has positive or negative influence over the earnings quality. 
We conjecture that the prior researches use the different approaches: such as alignment 
versus entrenchment, to explain agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders. Prior researches have proved that culture has relation with accounting 
practice in a country. We argue that culture also stimulates the individual or family’s 
behaviour in that firm to choose the alignment or entrenchment behaviour.  
 
This study examines the accruals (discretionary accruals, discretionary current accruals, and 
discretionary long-term accruals) level, as the proxy of earnings quality, of the family firms in four 
culture dimensions which established by Hofstede’s (1997). This study uses three groups of 
shareholders in family firms as samples (the one largest, the two largest, and the three largest 
shareholders) from 48 countries around the world.  
 
Based on ANOVA, this study proved that the difference of culture level has the different earnings 
quality. The result also reveals that there are different accruals pattern in different culture, such as 
power distance and individualism (collectivism) have linear pattern, but femininity (masculinity) and 
uncertainty avoidance have non-linear pattern. The linear accruals pattern implies that large (small) 
power distance or individualism (collectivism) culture has low (high) earnings quality or high (low) 
earnings quality, respectively. However, for the non linear accruals pattern of femininity 
(masculinity) or uncertainty avoidance culture implies that the evidence do not conform the prior 
research that masculinity has positive correlation with corruption level in societies or strong 
uncertainty avoidance concerns to more precise law.  
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1. Research Background 
Traditional agency theory has predicted that 
the delegation of capital by principal 
(shareholders) to agent (managers) causes 
agency conflict between both of them (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Recently, agency 
problem has spread from principal-agent 
conflict to majority-minority conflict, because 
of the low investor protection level in a 
country (La Porta et al., 1999). In that country, 
company ownership tends to concentrate on 
family or individual, so families own the 
majority of company’s shares or as controlling 
shareholder. As the consequence, majority 
shareholder has power to expropriate 
minority shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999).  
The family firms’ earnings quality 
issue is still interesting to study because the 
prior researches’ result have not yet 
conclusive. Many studies have proved that 
family firms have higher earnings quality than 
non-family firms (Ali et al. [2007]; Wang 
[2006]). The owner also as the founder of the 
firm understands about the activities of their 
management and company deeply (Andersen 
and Reeb, 2003), therefore the owner has 
capability to control managers’ behaviour 
directly (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). As the 
result, managers feel reluctant to manipulate 
the company’s financial statements (Ali et al., 
2007). Contrast with Fan and Wong (2002) 
and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2008), family firms 
have lower earnings quality than non-family 
firms. The family also takes role in 
management activities, so the family has 
privilege to get private benefit or information 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2008). The owners tend 
to deteriorate the financial statements 
credibility, because the financial statements 
are created for their interest (Fan and Wong, 
2002).    
We conjecture that the inconsistency 
results are caused by the different approach 
to explain agency conflict in family firms. 
There are two approaches: alignment and 
entrenchment, which explain why family as 
owner and member of management 
maintains or deteriorates earnings quality. 
Based on alignment approach, the family 
attempts to align their interest with 
management’s interest, so this condition can 
encourage the family firms achieve higher 
earnings quality than non family firms (Wang, 
2006). However, based on entrenchment 
approach, family as controlling shareholder 
has privileged to get private benefit by 
sacrificing minority shareholder, so it will 
deteriorate the earnings quality (Wang, 2006). 
The main problem is in what 
condition controlling shareholder chooses the 
alignment or entrenchment behaviour. This 
study argues that culture may become the 
encouragement for controlling shareholder’s 
behaviour to tend to alignment or 
entrenchment. Culture indicates the pattern 
of thinking, feeling, potential acting that 
studied by human in whole his/her life 
(Hofstede, 1997). Then, culture is also the 
manifestation in accounting system and 
accounting practice (Gray, 1988). If culture 
surrounding family firm influences the 
accounting practice then it will be 
implemented in the firm. Therefore, the 
culture in a country also influences the family 
firms’ behaviour which is manifested by the 
earnings quality of family firms.    
This study uses Hofstede’s 4 
dimensions of culture, such as: power 
distance (from small to large), individualism 
versus collectivism, femininity versus 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance (from 
strong to weak) as moderating variables. 
Hofstede (1997) establish score to measure 
the culture dimension. The score created by 
survey in companies around the world. The 
score updated regularly and the last update 
was done in 2007, but the results still 
consistent with the first score released. Family 
firm is measured by the share percentage 
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owned by individual or family in firm and the 
earnings quality is measured by the accruals 
(discretionary accrual, discretionary current 
accrual, and discretionary long-term accrual).  
This study divides countries’ culture 
score into three groups: low, middle, and high 
level of cultures. According to the research’s 
problem, this study examines the accrual level 
for the three groups. This study reveals three 
important evidences. First, any culture level 
has different earnings quality. Second, the 
family firms’ earnings quality in power 
distance and individualism culture have linear 
pattern, but power distance’s accruals have 
positive slope and individualism’s accruals 
have negative slope. It confirms the prior 
research that large (small) power distance 
encourages low (high) transparency and 
professionalism, and also higher individualism 
culture leads to higher earnings management. 
Third, contrast with both of cultures, 
femininity (masculinity) and uncertainty 
avoidance culture have non linear earnings 
quality pattern. The evidence reveals the 
family firms’ earnings quality is low (high) in 
extreme point of femininity or masculinity 
(uncertainty avoidance). Upon that, the 
entrenchment or alignment behaviour level of 
shareholder owners in family firms depend on 
the culture level.   
This study contributes to agency 
theory literatures through the evidence of 
entrenchment and alignment behaviour in 
family firms because of the culture level. This 
study expands Chen and Nowland (2008)’s 
finding that association between family and 
corporate governance are non-linear. This 
study also contributes for regulators to 
formulate the good corporate governance. 
The corporate governance formula has to 
consider the environment surrounding the 
firms, especially family firms. Commonly, 
corporate governance is formulated in widely 
dispersed ownership and liberalism or 
democracy environment which gives high 
appreciate with individual right.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
2.1 Agency Problem and Family Ownership 
Traditional agency theory emphasizes in conflict 
of interest between unmonitored manager and 
widely dispersed shareholders (Klein et al., 
2005). Shareholders (as principal) delegate the 
decision authority to managers (as agent), 
unfortunately, shareholders can not exactly 
monitor managers’ behaviour. Because both of 
groups have divergent interest, so managers 
concern to maximize their interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
Recently, the study of agency conflict 
shift away from shareholders-managers toward 
majority-minority agency conflict. LaPorta et al. 
(1998) stated that investor protection has 
negative relationship with the ownership 
concentration in company. In countries with 
weak investor protection, the firm ownership 
tends to concentrate in family, so that family 
becomes controlling shareholder. In that 
situation, agency conflict can happen between 
controlling owners and outside investors as 
minority shareholder (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
Claessens et al. (2000) and Fan and Wong (2002) 
also have proved that ownership structure of 
publicity traded companies in East Asian is 
dominated by family. Most of countries in East 
Asian categorized as low level protection 
investor by La Porta et al. (1998).    
This condition creates two opposite 
approaches possibility: entrenchment and 
alignment that illustrate the effect of the 
majority’s ability to control earnings quality of 
the family firm. The entrenchment approach 
implies that controlling shareholder may take 
benefit from the firm at cost of minority 
shareholder (Wang, 2006), because controlling 
owner has privilege to oversee accounting 
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reporting policies (Fan and Wong, 2002). This 
condition encourages in-efficiency rather than 
non family ownership, because family as 
majority shareholder tends to expropriate 
minority: a process using control to maximize 
their utility by distribution from other wealth, 
i.e. the minority shareholder (Setia-Atmaja et al., 
[2008]; Claessens et al., [2000]). For that reason, 
majority concerns to control management by 
hire CEO from their family members (Claessens 
et al., [2000]; LaPorta et al. [2000]). The CEO will 
be expected to publish financial information as 
their interest (Fan and Wong, 2002). Claessens 
et al. (2000) also proved that separation of 
management from ownership is rare and also 
about 60% of top managements are widely held 
by the family or the relatives of controlling 
shareholders. Family involvement in 
management attenuates manager and 
shareholder agency conflict (Wang, 2006). 
According this situation, family firms have lower 
earnings quality rather than non family firms, 
because the owners not only have power to 
control management, but also, they have higher 
encouragement to run earnings in order to 
maximize their utilities (Fan and Wong [2002]; 
Setia-Atmaja et al., [2008]).  
However, based on alignment approach, 
controlling shareholder concerns the long term 
orientation and good reputation protection 
(Wang, 2006). It shows that family ties to firm 
value family firm (Andersen and Reeb, 2003), so 
family firm concerns to higher quality earning 
information (Wang, 2006). According to this 
reason, controlling shareholder has incentive to 
monitor managers (Andersen and Reeb, 2003). It 
implies that family firm has effective monitoring 
mechanism, so managers feel reluctant to 
manipulate financial statements (Ali et al., 
2007). Therefore, family firm is associated with 
lower abnormal accruals (Wang, 2006). In 
another side, transforming the ownerships from 
widely dispersed ownership to concentrated 
ownership, such as: family ownership (Earle et 
al., 2005) can align the shareholders and 
managers’ interest, so it can increase the control 
of shareholders to managers (Wang, 2006).  
 
2.2 Culture Dimension and Accounting 
Practice 
Hofstede (1997) defines culture as a collective 
phenomena, because it is learnt and studied by 
people who live together in certain social 
environment. People, child to adult, learn 
culture from their family, school, and work 
environments, moreover, these environments 
relate to each other. As a result, they bring 
culture from their family along to school and 
work.  
Hofstede (1997) proposes four 
dimensions of culture that these are labelled, 
such individualism (versus collectivism), power 
distance (from small to large), uncertainty 
avoidance (from strong to weak), and 
masculinity (versus femininity). The dimensions 
are an extraction of the basic problems in this 
society which have become worldwide. The 
problems also have a consequence for the 
functioning of societies, of groups within those 
societies, and of individuals within those groups 
(Hofstede, 1997: 13). Understanding dimensions 
of culture is far a way to understand the culture 
of the certain environment.  
Gray (1988) stated that Hofstede’ s 
finding is probably one of the most extensive 
cross cultural surveys ever conducted because 
the survey conducted in more than the fifty 
countries. The finding also shows that countries 
could be grouped into culture areas based on 
their score on the four value dimensions. 
According to Gray (1988), the point of the 
finding is the relationship between the social 
value orientation and the development of 
accounting systems because it has institutional 
consequences in form of the legal system, 
political system, nature of capital market, 
pattern of corporate ownership, and so on 
(figure 1).      
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Figure 1: Culture, Societal Value and The 
Accounting Sub-Culture 
 
Source: Gray (1988)  
Culture is manifestation of value has to 
be obeyed by members of society (Hofstede, 
1997). The values will be implemented in where 
they work or when they interact with others. 
Thereof, Gray (1998) stated if the cultures which 
are identified as dimension of the cultural value 
should be possible to establish accounting 
values, then, systems are implemented in 
society, such as: accounting system, actually as 
manifestation of culture in that society. Gray 
(1998) stated the relationship between cultures 
with accounting values and practice as in figure 
2. Empirical evidence found by 
Ussahawanitchakit (2008) proved that 
organizational culture had positive correlation 
with earnings quality because it presents set of 
strongly held values, beliefs, norms, habits, and 
symbols according to which the members of an 
organization operate.   
 
Figure 2: The Relationship Cultures and Values 
 Professio
nalism 
Uniformity Conservatism Transpa
rency 
Individualis
m 
High Low Low Low 
Power 
Distance 
Small Large No 
Relationship 
Large 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Weak Strong 
 
Strong Strong 
Masculinity High No 
Relationship 
High Low 
Source: Gray (1998) 
 
a. Large versus Small Power Distance and 
Earnings Quality 
The manifestation of large power distance 
culture is shown by the dependency of society’s 
members in their groups that also depends on 
certain the powered figure (Hofstede, 1997). It 
considers that extant power and hierarchical 
relationship is essential in the given culture 
(Kaasa and Vadi, 2008). Therein, a large power 
distance can be characterized by centralized 
decisions structure and extensively uses formal 
rules. Kaasa and Vadi (2007) revealed that 
power distance has negative effect on 
innovation initiation, because it relates with the 
low accommodation level of all member 
organization interest (Gray, 1988). Power 
distance level also has relationship with 
communication gap between superior and 
subordinates, because higher power distance 
associates with greater communication gap 
between superior and subordinates in 
organization (Khatri, 2009).    
 In ownership perspective, Chakrabarty 
(2009) found that higher the power distance 
level in a country then larger the domination of 
family firms in capital market. Because of family 
as a majority owner in firm, the family can 
control, decide management policy, and also 
choose managers (Ali et al. 2007). This condition 
encourages low flexibility, low transparency, and 
low professionalism in accounting values (Guan 
et al., 2005). Hence, the power distance culture 
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will diminish earnings quality if larger of firm 
shares owned by individual or family. 
 
Hypothesis 1: the different power distance level 
in family firms has the different 
earnings quality  
 
b. Individualism versus Collectivism and 
Earnings Quality 
Individualism is the one side versus its opposite, 
collectivism, that is degree to which individuals 
are integrated into groups (Desender et al., 
2007). In collectivistic societies people are 
connected to each other through strong and 
cohesive groups that protect them during their 
life: it assumed that people are loyal to these 
groups (Kaasa and Vadi, 2008). This condition 
causes regulation of societies and political 
system unbalanced. Therefore, Kaasa and Vadi 
(2007) suggested that there is a positive 
relationship between individualism and 
innovation initiation.   
Chakrabarty (2009) revealed that higher 
the collectivism level in country then larger firms 
in that country owned by family. In one side, 
domination family in firm reduces agency cost or 
conflict between shareholders and managers. 
Family has power to hire CEO and will point CEO 
who will align her/his interest with family’s 
interest (Wang, 2006). It means family directly 
can control their managers (Demsetz dan Lehn, 
1985). In other side, because family directly can 
access information or understand about 
company activities deeply (Andersen dan Reeb, 
2003), of course, managers will feel reluctant to 
manipulate the company’s financial reporting 
(Ali et al., 2007). As a result, manager is also 
suspected unfair as regard to majority-minority 
interest, because people in cohesive in-groups 
society continue protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty (Desender et al., 2007). 
Therefore, Desender et al. (2007) proved that 
higher collectivism level could lead to higher 
earnings management level.  
 
Hypothesis 2: the difference of individualism 
(collectivism) level in family firms 
has the different earnings quality     
 
c. Femininity versus Masculinity and Earnings 
Quality 
Femininity-masculinity orientates toward 
achievement and competition (Kaasa and Vadi, 
2008). If masculine culture that dominated by 
men prefers being independent or self 
assertiveness in career, then, femininity culture 
describes about discretion, modesty, tolerance, 
and solidarity. Then, femininity focuses on 
people and a more supportive climate, so that is 
why masculinity has negative relationship with 
innovation initiation and economic creativity 
(Kaasa and Vadi, 2008).   
In firm dominated by family, the owner 
has privilege to get private information from 
manager who hired by the family. Perhaps, 
owners only disclose information which they 
want to disclose, as the finding of Fan and Wong 
(2002) that CEO will be expected to publish 
financial information as their interest. Chan and 
Cheung (2008) stated that femininity culture in 
family firm encourage the owners to prioritize 
the societies interest. It implies majority owners 
will prioritize firm sustainability and will not 
expropriate minority. Therefore, Chan and 
Cheung (2008) suggested that masculinity 
culture has positive correlation with corruption 
level in societies.         
Hypothesis 3: the difference of femininity level 
in family firms has the different 
earnings quality  
 
d. Strong versus Weak Uncertainty Avoidance 
and Earnings Quality 
Uncertainty avoidance (from high to low) culture 
relates to the anxiety level of society (Hofstede, 
2007). Hofstede (1997) stated that in countries 
with strong uncertainty avoidance tend to have 
more and more precise laws than that in those 
with weak uncertainty avoidance, because they 
want to avoid high uncertainty avoidance. 
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Therefore, in societies with low uncertainty 
avoidance, organization rules can be violated for 
pragmatic reasons, conflicts are considered as a 
natural part of life, and ambiguous situations 
regarded as natural and interesting (Kaasa and 
Vadi, 2008). As a result, the strong uncertainty 
avoidance culture adopts rules to minimize 
ambiguity, because the culture open minds of 
positive idea and concern to reform it good 
(Chen and Cheung, 2008). Perhaps, the societies 
implement accounting principles rigidly.    
Family owner is concerned with 
reputation, survival, wealth, and heritage for 
descendant (Wang, 2006). To maintain their 
interest, as majority, family wants to control 
management by hired CEO from their member 
(LaPorta et al., 1999). Actually, family can 
control the manager behaviour directly 
(Demsetz dan Lehn, 1985) and has information 
or understand about company activities deeply 
(Andersen dan Reeb, 2003), Majority’s privilege 
which surrounding with low uncertainty 
avoidance culture encourages the rules 
violation, includes: accounting principles, then 
the situation can deteriorate the earnings 
quality.  
 
Hypothesis 4: the difference of uncertainty 
avoidance level in family firms has 
the different earnings quality  
 
3. Research Method 
3. 1 Data Collection and Sample Selection  
This research uses secondary data served by 
Osiris Database from 2002-2008 to determine 
accrual and to identify family firms. This 
research uses manufacture firms as sample 
because these firms do not have unique 
heavily regulation as financial firms and match 
for the modified Jones’s accrual accounting 
formula. They are taken from capital market 
of countries that culture scores have been 
identified by Hofstede (1997). There are 53 of 
the countries’ culture scores, but Osiris 
Database only provides data for 48 countries. 
The total of manufacture companies from the 
countries is 14,276 (see Appendix). Then, this 
study chooses the firms that their shares 
owned by individuals or families. There are 
7,055 companies in 48 countries which have 
individual or family as shareholders.    
 This study examines the level of 
accruals for three groups of samples: such as 
the one largest, the two largest, and the three 
largest shareholders. For this objective, every 
group has to hold more than 20% shares in 
their firms. We sort shareholders in every firm 
based on the share ownership percentage to 
identify the largest shareholder. It means, the 
one largest sample determined by one 
individual or family who has the largest share 
and has more than 20% shares. For the two 
largest shareholders, they are sum of the two 
largest individual shareholders who has more 
than 20% shares. Then, sum of three largest 
individual shareholders who has more than 
20% shares are the three largest 
shareholders. The samples of the one largest 
shareholder are 1,484 family firms, the two 
largest shareholders are 2,117 family firms, 
and then the three largest shareholders are 
2,418 family firms.  
 To execute the accrual level 
estimation of family firms from 2002-2007, 
we only include the firms which have 
consecutive data from 2002-2007. Finally, we 
got 872 samples for the one largest 
shareholder, 1,275 samples for the two 
largest shareholders, and 1,489 samples for 
the three largest shareholders. Because every 
country does not have the same samples and 
the unit of analysis is country level, this study 
takes the ten largest firms for each country. It 
means, we eliminate the countries which have 
less than ten family firms. The number of 
countries that have the one largest, the two 
largest, and three largest shareholders in a 
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firm are, respectively, 17, 19, and 20 
countries.  
 
3.2  Culture Index (CLI) Variable  
This research uses Hofstede’s culture score as 
culture index for countries. We uses Hofstede‘ 
s index culture because the score is used in 
prior several researches and Hofstede also 
have updated the scores as the last update at 
2007. The study arranges the culture’s score 
of every culture from the lowest to highest 
and then it is divided by three levels: low, 
middle, and high culture levels. Therefore, 
this study distinguishes the level of earnings 
quality between three levels of cultures 
(power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
and uncertainty avoidance). 
 
3.3  Earnings Quality (EQ) Variable 
Earnings quality is determined by managers’ 
operational discretion and long-term 
investment discretion. According to Setia-
Atmaja (2008), we employ discretionary 
current accruals to capture managers’ 
operational discretion, because managers are 
likely to manage discretionary accruals (also 
referred to working capital accruals), such as: 
expedite or delay delivery of goods and 
services in the last month of financial year in 
order to fit their reporting incentive and/or 
interest. We also argue that it is important to 
observe discretionary long-term accruals, 
because managers may use their discretion to 
expedite or delay investment in long-term 
assets (plant, property and equipment) (Setia-
Atmaja, 2008). 
Then, the modified Jones (1991) 
model used to measure discretionary accrual 
level. Discretionary current accruals (DCA) 
calculated by subtracting non-discretionary 
current accruals (NDCA) from total current 
accruals (TCA). Equation 1 is used to calculate 
total current accruals (TCA). The TCA, or non-
cash working capital accruals, is computed as 
changes in non-cash current assets, excluding 
changes in short-term investments (STI), 
minus changes in current liabilities (CL) 
excluding changes in short term debt (STD), 
which is derived from the current maturity of 
long-term debt. 
We use the regression model in 
equation 2 to capture the coefficients of the 
cross-sectional variables α0 and α1 for the 
control firms (i.e., non-family firms) in the 
same industry sector for each financial year 
over the period 2002-2007. These control 
(non-sample) firm coefficients are used as the 
basis to estimate the non-discretionary 
current accruals for sample firms for each 
financial year. To compute non-discretionary 
current accruals, we apply these coefficients 
to the variables α0 and α1 representing the 
sample firms to equation 3 for the family 
firms data in period 2008. 
TCA t = ΔCAt −ΔCasht −ΔSTIt − 
ΔCLt −ΔSTDt  (1) 
Notes: 
TCAt = Total Current Accruals in year t 
ΔCasht= Cash t less Casht-1 
ΔCAt = Current Assets in year t less Current 
Assets in yeart-1 
ΔSTIt = Short-term Investment in year t less 
Short-term Investment in yeart-1 
ΔCLt = Current Liabilities in year t less Current 
Liabilities in yeart-1 
ΔSTDt = Short-term Debt in year t less Short-
term Debt in yeart-1 
 
 
Notes: 
j = Control (non-
family) firms 
i = Sample (family 
firms) 
TCA = Total 
Aj,t-1 = Total Assets in 
yeart-1 
ΔREVj,t = Revenue in 
year t – Revenue in 
year t-1 
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Current Accruals 
NDCA = Non-
Discretionary 
Current Accruals 
 
ΔTRj,t = Trade 
Receivables in year t – 
Trade Receivables in 
year t-1 
ε j,t = Error term in 
year t for control (non-
family) firms j 
We calculate discretionary current accruals 
(DCA) for the family firm data in period 2008 
by subtracting non-discretionary current 
accruals (NDCA) (see equation 4) from total 
current accruals (TCA) scaled by lagged assets 
respectively. 
    DCAi,t = (TCAi,t/Ai,t-1) – NDCAi,t (4) 
We calculate discretionary long-term 
accruals (DLA) by subtracting discretionary 
current accruals (DCA) from discretionary 
accruals (DA). To derive DA, we first calculate 
the nondiscretionary accruals (NDA). To 
obtain NDA, we calculate the coefficients α0, 
α1 and α2 on the control (non-family) firm 
variables for each financial year by employing 
the regression model in equation 5. NDA is 
derived by applying the coefficients obtained 
from equation 5 to equation 6 on sample firm 
variables for the family firm data in period 
2008. DA is calculated using equation 7. After 
obtaining DA and NDA, we calculate DLA and 
NDLA by subtracting DCA and NDCA from DA 
and NDA, respectively (see equations 8 and 
9). 
 
 
 
4. Result and Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This study deploys ANOVA to screen the 
tendency of the family firms’ entrenchment or 
alignment behaviour. We expect that the 
different level of culture also has different 
accruals level. Based on Hofstede’s culture 
score, we divide it into three levels (low, 
middle, and high), then we examine the 
family firms’ accruals on it.   
Based on the accruals data of the one 
largest shareholder, the low level of the 
power distance culture has the lowest DA 
(Discretionary Accrual), DCA (Discretionary 
Current Accrual), and DLA (Discretionary Long 
Term Accrual) mean compare with the others 
level (Table 1 Panel A). The middle level of the 
power distance culture has higher mean of 
accruals rather than the low one. Therefore, 
the high level of the power distance culture 
has the highest accruals mean among the 
three level of the power distance culture 
score. This result implies that power distance 
culture has linear relationship with accruals 
for the one largest shareholder (Figure 3).  
 For the two largest shareholders, the 
low level of the power distance culture also 
have the lowest accruals mean, then the 
accruals of the middle power distance culture 
level has the second lowest accruals mean 
(Table 1 Panel B). Thereof, the high level of 
the power distance culture has the highest 
accruals mean compared to others power 
distance level. The increasing accruals are 
same as the increasing of the power distance 
level, so it shows the linear relationship 
between accruals and culture level for the 
two largest shareholders (Figure 3). The 
accruals mean: DA, DCA, and DLA of the three 
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largest shareholders are also linear with the 
level of power distance culture (Table 1 Panel 
C). It shows that the highest level of the 
power distance culture tends to have the 
highest accruals and the lowest level of power 
distance culture also has the lowest accruals 
(Figure 3). However, for DCA, the high level of 
culture has the highest accrual mean, then it 
is followed by the low level as the second 
highest accrual mean, and finally the middle 
level is the lowest accrual mean.  
Most of lines in the one, two, and 
three shareholders that relates with power 
distance and accruals level have positive slope 
(Figure 3). It implies the low power distance 
level in family firms has low accruals. Then, 
for middle level has middle accruals and the 
high power distance culture level has high 
accruals level.   
 
Table 1:  Power Distance Culture 
Panel A:  The One Largest Shareholder 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1555 0.1672 0.1943 
SD 0.10201 0.19621 0.12585 
2 DCA Mean 0.0702 0.0911 0.1469 
SD 0.07351 0.19081 0.54002 
3 DLA Mean 0.1714 0.1985 0.2235 
SD 0.11336 0.35674 0.46720 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.1324 0.1523 0.1883 
SD 0.07332 0.23576 0.35304 
 
Panel B: The Two Largest Shareholders 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1433 0.1882 0.2186 
SD 0.09998 0.18125 0.15741 
2 DCA Mean 0.0578 0.0742 0.1640 
SD 0.05800 0.16062 0.52678 
3 DLA Mean 0.1378 0.1943 0.2727 
SD 0.09881 0.32696 0.51532 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean             0.1130 0.1523 0.2184 
SD 0.06739 0.21533 0.37382 
 
Panel C: The Three Largest Shareholders 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1499 0.1887 0.2135 
SD 0.11881 0.18439 0.15619 
2 DCA Mean 0.0806 0.0704 0.1642 
SD 0.22283 0.16057 0.52668 
3 DLA Mean 0.1547 0.2032 0.2741 
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SD 0.15661 0.32996 0.51511 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.1284 0.1541 0.2172 
SD 0.15038 0.21692 0.37368 
 
 
Figure 3: Power Distance 
 
 
 
In individualism culture, the one 
largest shareholder group has the lowest 
mean of the discretionary accrual (DA) for the 
high culture level (Table 2 Panel A). However, 
the low culture level has the highest DA 
mean, then the high culture level has the 
second highest level of DA mean. According to 
discretionary current accrual (DCA) and 
discretionary long-term accrual (DLA), the one 
largest shareholder has the lowest level of 
accruals mean for the middle level, then it is 
followed by the high level as the second 
lowest accruals mean, and the low level has 
the highest level accruals mean.  
For the two largest shareholders, the 
low level of individual culture has highest 
accruals mean, then the middle level has the 
second highest accruals mean, and the high 
level has the lowest level of accruals mean 
(Table 2 Panel B). For the three largest 
shareholders, the examination results show 
that the low level of individual culture has the 
highest level of the accruals mean: DA, DCA, 
and DLA, but the high level has the lowest 
accruals mean (Table 2 Panel C). The lines in 
the one, two, and three shareholders that 
relates individualism and accruals level are 
dominated by the linear line but they have 
negative slope (Figure 4)  It implies the low 
individualism level in family firms has high 
accruals. The middle level has middle 
accruals, but the high individualism level has 
low accruals level.   
 
Table 2:  The Individualism (Collectivism) Culture 
Panel A: The One Largest Shareholder 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.2129 0.1578 0.1368 
SD 0.19745 0.10380 0.11008 
2 DCA Mean 0.1636 0.0598 0.0724 
SD 0.51551 0.07112 0.10777 
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3 DLA Mean 0.2494 0.1672 0.1677 
SD 0.53709 0.11484 0.14130 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.2086 0.1283 0.1256 
SD 0.38601 0.07444 0.09186 
 
 
Panel B: The Two Largest Shareholders 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.2227 0.1864 0.1478 
SD 0.19916 0.14510 0.10263 
2 DCA Mean 0.1583 0.0888 0.0525 
SD 0.51713 0.20426 0.04519 
3 DLA Mean 0.2794 0.1877 0.1458 
SD 0.53435 0.31765 0.10621 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.2202 0.1543 0.1154 
SD 0.38617 0.20841 0.06955 
 
Panel C: The Three Largest Shareholders 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.2165 0.1899 0.1460 
SD 0.20099 0.15237 0.10371 
2 DCA Mean 0.1517 0.1088 0.0530 
SD 0.51805 0.28492 0.04661 
3 DLA Mean 0.2862 0.2013 0.1462 
SD 053535 0.31860 0.10575 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.2181 0.1667 0.1151 
SD 0.38725 0.23417 0.06979 
 
Figure 4: Individualism (Collectivism) 
 
 
 
In masculinity culture, the middle 
level of masculinity culture has the highest DA 
mean, then the low level has the second 
highest mean of DA. Of course, the high level 
of masculinity culture has the lowest mean. 
The DCA and DLA in low level of culture is the 
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lowest accruals mean (Table 3 Panel A). Then, 
the high level has the second lowest accruals 
mean and the middle level has the highest 
accruals.  
 For the two largest shareholders, the 
lowest accruals mean level belong to the high 
level of masculinity culture (Table 3 Panel B). 
The middle level has the highest accruals 
mean, then the low level has the second 
highest accruals mean. For the three largest 
shareholders, the middle level of masculinity 
culture has the highest accruals mean and the 
high level has the lowest accruals mean (Table 
3 Panel C). The low level has the second 
highest accruals mean.  
 Contrast with power distance and 
individualism (collectivism) culture, the graph 
pattern of masculinity culture is non-linier 
(Figure 5). In low level of culture, the 
masculinity culture has low accruals mean, 
then the accruals mean increases to the 
certain point (the middle culture level). After 
that, the accruals mean decreases, so the high 
culture level has the lowest accruals level.       
 
Table 3: The Masculinity Culture 
Panel A: The One Largest Shareholder  
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1603 0.2275 0.1348 
SD 0.09801 0.21823 0.09725 
2 DCA Mean 0.0798 0.1646 0.0668 
SD 0.08758 0.56404 0.09948 
3 DLA Mean 0.1447 0.3003 0.1613 
SD 0.10218 0.58268 0.13087 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.1283 0.2308 0.1210 
SD 0.06804 0.42106 0.08538 
 
Table 3: The Masculinity Culture (continued) 
Panel B: The Two Largest Shareholders  
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1749 0.2148 0.1560 
SD 0.09562 0.21707 0.09937 
2 DCA Mean 0.0683 0.1576 0.0563 
SD 0.07083 0.50806 0.06327 
3 DLA Mean 0.1538 0.2860 0.1497 
SD 0.09914 0.56587 0.10892 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.1323 0.2194 0.1207 
SD 0.06788 0.40084 0.07239 
 
Panel C: The Three Largest Shareholders 
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1803 0.2159 0.1562 
SD 0.11971 0.22754 0.10318 
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2 DCA Mean 0.0886 0.1731 0.0548 
SD 0.22510 0.54748 0.06057 
3 DLA Mean 0.1773 0.3081 0.1514 
SD 0.16344 0.60752 0.10843 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.1487 0.2324 0.1208 
SD 0.15089 0.43073 0.07293 
 
Figure 5: Masculinity 
 
 
 
The accruals: DA, DCA, and DLA data 
of the one largest shareholder in uncertainty 
avoidance culture show that the low level has 
the highest accruals mean (Table 4 Panel A). 
The middle level has the lowest accruals 
mean. Finally the high level has the second 
lowest accruals mean.  
However, for the two largest 
shareholders’ discretionary accrual (DA), the 
low level of uncertainty avoidance culture has 
the second highest accrual mean (Table 4 
Panel B). Then, the highest mean belongs to 
the high level of uncertainty avoidance 
culture. Finally, the lowest mean belongs to 
the middle level of uncertainty avoidance. For 
discretionary current accrual (DCA), the 
highest accrual mean belongs to high level of 
uncertainty avoidance, the second highest 
mean belongs to the middle uncertainty 
avoidance, and the lowest mean belongs to 
the low level of uncertainty avoidance culture. 
For discretionary long-term accrual (DLA), the 
middle culture level has the lowest accrual 
mean, the high culture level has the second 
lowest mean, and the low level has the third 
lowest accrual mean. 
In the three largest shareholders, the 
highest DA mean is in the high level of 
uncertainty avoidance (Table 4 Panel C). Then, 
the second highest DA mean is in the low level 
of culture and the lowest DA mean is in the 
middle level. For the DCA, the low level has 
the highest DCA mean, the high level has the 
second highest DCA mean, and then, the 
middle level has the lowest DCA mean. For 
DLA, the low level has the highest accrual 
mean. The high level has the second highest 
accrual mean and the middle level has the 
lowest accrual.  
The accruals of uncertainty avoidance 
have non-linear pattern, but it has opposite 
shape with masculinity (Figure 6). Contrast 
with masculinity, the middle level of 
uncertainty avoidance culture has the lowest 
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accruals level. Therefore, the accruals mean is 
high in the low culture level, then the accruals 
decline until certain point (the middle culture 
level). After that, the accruals incline toward 
to high culture level. 
 
Table 4: The Uncertainty Avoidance Culture 
Panel A: The One Largest Shareholder  
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1970 0.1323 0.1881 
SD 0.12867 0.10441 0.18902 
2 DCA Mean 0.1552 0.0648 0.0896 
SD 0.54133 0.09954 0.17209 
3 DLA Mean 0.2602 0.1510 0.1884 
SD 0.46364 0.13222 0.34792 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.2041 0.1161 0.1554 
SD 0.35181 0.08712 0.22795 
 
 
Table 4: The Uncertainty Avoidance Culture (Continued) 
Panel B: The Two Largest Shareholders  
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1930 0.1612 0.2005 
SD 0.16714 0.10886 0.18263 
2 DCA Mean 0.1496 0.0537 0.0962 
SD 0.52639 0.05888 0.17773 
3 DLA Mean 0.2623 0.1468 0.2036 
SD 0.51737 0.10074 0.35047 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.2016 0.1206 0.1668 
SD 0.37742 0.07234 0.22820 
Panel C: The Three Largest Shareholders  
No Variable The Low Level of  
Culture 
The Middle Level 
of  Culture 
The High Level of  
Culture  
1 DA Mean 0.1874 0.1640 0.1935 
SD 0.15875 0.12111 0.18094 
2 DCA Mean 0.1351 0.0819 0.0864 
SD 0.48823 0.24097 0.16654 
3 DLA Mean 0.2528 0.1617 0.2015 
SD 0.48126 0.16158 0.33031 
4 The Mean of 
Accruals 
Mean 0.1918 0.1359 0.1605 
SD 0.35084 0.15932 0.21597 
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Figure 6: Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Testing 
The one largest individual shareholder in 
family firms have insignificant DA, DCA, and 
also DLA for power distance culture (Table 5, 
panel A). However, the two largest 
shareholders in family firms also only have 
significant DA (0.026). As well as the one 
largest shareholder, they do not have 
insignificant DCA or DLA for power distance 
culture. The result of the three largest 
shareholders in family firms also shows that 
they have significant DA (0.064), but they 
have insignificant DCA and DLA for power 
distance culture. The significant result of DA 
implies that there is different DA level in the 
different power distance level. According to 
H1, the difference of power distance level in 
family firms has different earnings quality, 
therefore, H1 supported by the result. The 
difference of DA between the three of power 
distance culture level shows the different 
earnings quality in family firms owned by the 
two or three largest shareholders, because of 
the different power distance level. However, 
the one largest shareholder as the owner in 
family firms does not have low earnings 
quality as well as the others.   
 For individualism (collectivism) 
culture, the DA of firm families is significant 
for the one largest (0.018), the two largest 
(0.021), and the three largest shareholders 
(0,033) (Table 5). However, the only DCA of 
the two largest shareholders and the only DLA 
of the three largest shareholders are 
moderate. According to H2, the difference of 
collectivism level in family firms has the 
different earnings quality, therefore H2 
supported by the result. The difference of DA 
between the three of individualism 
(collectivism) culture level shows the different 
earnings quality in family firms owned by the 
one, two, or three largest shareholders.   
 For femininity (masculinity) culture, 
the one largest shareholder has significant DA 
(0.003) and DLA (0.031), but it has 
insignificant DCA (Table 5 Panel A). For the 
two largest shareholders, they have 
significant DCA (0.043), moderate DA, and 
insignificant DCA (Table 5 Panel B). The three 
largest shareholders have significant DLA 
(0.029), moderate DA (0.094), and 
insignificant DCA (Table 5 Panel C). According 
to H3, the difference of femininity level in 
family firms has the different earnings quality, 
H3 supported by the result. The difference of 
DA between the three of femininity 
(masculinity) culture level shows the different 
earnings quality in family firms owned by the 
one, two or three largest shareholders.  
 For uncertainty avoidance culture, the 
only DA of the one largest shareholder is 
significant (0.039) (Table 5 Panel A). Although 
most of results are insignificant, the H4 states 
the difference of uncertainty avoidance level 
in family firms has the different earnings 
quality is supported, because there is 
evidence of the different DA in three 
uncertainty avoidance culture levels.  
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Table 5: The ANOVA Testing for Accruals 
Panel A: The One Largest Shareholder  
No Variable PDI IDV MAS UAI 
1 DA F-Test 0,965 4,121 5,926 3,311 
Sig. 0,383 0,018 0,003 0,039 
2 DCA F-Test 0,837 1,906 1,502 1,167 
Sig. 0,435 0,152 0,226 0,314 
3 DLA F-Test 0,328 1,160 3,540 1,475 
Sig. 0,721 0,316 0,031 0,232 
4 The 
Mean of 
Accruals 
F-Test 0,742 2,264 3,553 1,845 
Sig. 0,478 0,107 0,031 0,161 
 
Panel B: The Two Largest Shareholders 
No Variable PDI IDV MAS UAI 
1 DA F-Test 3,742 3,950 2,524 1,217 
Sig. 0,026 0,021 0,083 0,299 
2 DCA F-Test 2,025 1,873 2,068 1,507 
Sig. 0,135 0,157 0,129 0,224 
3 DLA F-Test 2,181 2,352 3,189 1,698 
Sig. 0,116 0,098 0,043 0,186 
4 The 
Mean of 
Accruals 
F-Test 2,728 2,866 3,092 1,702 
Sig. 0,068 0,059 0,048 0,185 
 
Panel C: The Three Largest Shareholders 
No Variable PDI IDV MAS UAI 
1 DA F-Test 2,790 3,471 2,393 0,625 
Sig. 0,064 0,033 0,094 0,536 
2 DCA F-Test 1,524 1,457 2,166 0,534 
Sig. 0,220 0,235 0,117 0,587 
3 DLA F-Test 1,833 2,542 3,594 1,069 
Sig. 0,163 0,081 0,029 0,345 
4 The 
Mean of 
Accruals 
F-Test 2,006 2,612 3,268 0,764 
Sig. 0,137 0,076 0,040 0,467 
 
5. Discussion and Limitation 
This study examines the accruals: 
discretionary accrual, discretionary current 
accrual, and discretionary long-term accrual 
level of family firms in power distance (large 
versus small), individualism versus 
collectivism, femininity versus masculinity, 
and uncertainty avoidance (strong versus 
weak) culture. This study’s objective provides 
evidence about in what condition the majority 
shareholder owners in family firms behave 
alignment or entrenchment, because this 
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behaviour has implication for the family firms’ 
earnings quality. 
 This study uses the three shareholder 
groups: one largest, two largest, and three 
largest shareholders in family firms over 48 
countries. Their accruals level is examined for 
the three culture levels: low, middle, and high 
level. This study proves that every culture 
level has different accrual level. This study 
also proves that the majority owner in family 
firms tends to choose the entrenchment 
behaviour if the family firms have high power 
distance, and vice versa. As prior result, the 
family firms which have high power distance 
culture level encourages low flexibility, low 
transparency, and low professionalism in 
accounting values (Guan et al., 2005). Hence, 
the stronger power distance culture will 
diminish family firms’ earnings quality.   
This study also reveals that the 
majority owner in family firms tends to 
choose the entrenchment behaviour if the 
family firms have low individualism level. This 
evidence matches with prior evidence that 
higher collectivism level could lead to higher 
earnings management level (Desender et al., 
2007), then it will deteriorate family firms’ 
earnings quality. It implies majority owner 
directly can control their managers (Demsetz 
dan Lehn, 1985), and can access information 
or understand about company activities 
deeply (Andersen dan Reeb, 2003), but 
people in cohesive in-groups society continue 
protecting them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty (Desender et al., 2007).  
However, the majority shareholders 
behave as the highest entrenchment in the 
middle masculinity culture level, but the 
lowest entrenchment is in low or high 
masculinity level. This condition implies that 
the entrenchment behaviour will turn up until 
reach certain the level, it will turn down over 
that level. This evidence contrasts with prior 
result that femininity culture in family firm 
encourages the owners to prioritize the 
society interest (Chan and Cheung, 2008) and 
masculinity culture has positive relation with 
corruption level in societies (Chan and 
Cheung, 2008). Especially, there is one or 
three largest shareholders as owners imply 
the majority has privilege to get private 
information from manager who hired by the 
family.  
In uncertainty avoidance culture, the 
majority owner (one largest shareholder) 
behaves as the highest entrenchment in low 
uncertainty avoidance, but the lowest 
entrenchment level is in middle level. This 
evidence confirms prior research that in 
countries with strong uncertainty avoidance 
tend to be more and more precise laws than 
that in those with weak uncertainty 
avoidance, because they want to avoid high 
uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1997). 
However, the lowest level behaves in middle 
level shows that the one largest shareholder 
may afford the uncertainty, but this situation 
is different if the share ownership dispersed.  
Samples become as this main 
limitation in this study. Countries that used as 
sample do not have the same number of 
family firms, because this study also faces 
difficulty to trace the ultimate ownership. 
Osiris Database does not provide the ultimate 
ownership data. The future research has to 
use survey method for the more robust result.  
 
***** 
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Appendix  
The number of Family Firms Samples 
 
Number Country A B C D E F G H 
1 Argentina 43 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Australia 362 276 21 12 39 26 50 30 
3 Austria 38 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 Belgium 62 23 0 0 3 1 3 1 
5 Brazil 159 12 1 1 2 2 2 2 
6 Canada 427 125 35 22 50 32 50 32 
7 Chile 59 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 Colombia 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Costa Rica 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Denmark 59 26 2 2 3 3 6 6 
11 Ecuador 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Finland 62 55 7 7 9 9 10 10 
13 France 298 178 56 40 72 52 76 56 
14 Germany 339 175 63 42 79 53 84 58 
15 Greece 126 104 61 60 75 72 81 78 
16 Guatemala 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Hong Kong 53 37 4 3 6 4 6 5 
18 India 1870 631 99 40 149 58 186 69 
19 Indonesia 154 14 2 2 3 3 3 3 
20 Ireland 17 17 2 2 2 2 2 2 
21 Israel 212 25 9 9 10 10 11 11 
22 Italy 124 100 10 9 14 13 16 15 
23 Jamaica 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
24 Japan 1664 105 20 13 26 18 26 18 
25 Korea 1084 995 415 81 585 120 637 135 
26 Malaysia 450 395 79 77 111 108 126 123 
27 Mexico 46 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
28 Netherland 58 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 
29 New Zealand 37 35 4 4 5 5 10 9 
30 Norway 50 33 1 1 1 1 2 2 
31 Pakistan 306 6 0 0 1 1 2 2 
32 Panama 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 Peru 57 18 6 6 10 10 10 10 
34 Philippines 50 32 2 2 2 2 3 2 
35 Portugal 20 14 5 2 5 2 5 2 
36 Singapore 300 251 55 54 78 77 91 89 
37 South Africa 89 30 3 2 6 5 6 5 
38 Spain 54 54 6 6 6 6 6 6 
39 Sweden 173 79 17 16 23 22 23 22 
40 Switzerland 117 71 16 15 24 23 26 25 
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The number of Family Firms Samples (Continued) 
 
Number Country A B C D E F G H 
41 Taiwan 1187 1123 42 39 125 118 208 194 
42 Thailand 224 20 5 4 5 4 5 4 
43 Turkey 143 42 15 12 22 17 24 19 
44 United Arab Emirates 22 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
45 United Kingdom 434 397 45 36 81 65 91 74 
46 
United Stated of 
America 3160 1497 370 245 479 325 525 364 
47 Uruguay 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 Venezuela 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                    
SUM   14276 7055 1484 872 2117 1275 2418 1489 
 
A = Number of manufacturing companies 
B = A that owned by individual/family 
C = B that the 1 largest family ownership has 20% or more  
D = C that has completed data 
C = B that the 1 largest family ownership has 20% or more  
D = C that has completed data 
E = B that the 2 largest family ownership has 20% or more  
F = E that has completed data 
G = B that the 3 largest family ownership has 20% or more  
H = G that has completed data 
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